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‘Security for Costs’ Under the 
ICSID Regime: Does it Prevent 
‘Arbitral Hit-and-Runs’ or Does it 
Unduly Stifle Third-Party Funded 
Investors’ Due Process Rights? 
 
Young Hye (Martina) Chun* 
Abstract: This Article considers security for costs under the 
ICSID regime.  Given that all security for costs have been 
ordered against third-party funded investors—with the latest 
decision, Unionmatex, in January 2020, this Article 
examines prior ICSID decisions to determine whether third-
party funded investors are prejudiced when it comes to 
security for costs.  It further addresses whether an 
applicant’s right to a costs award is a “protectable right” 
under Article 47 and concludes that it is not.  Finding that 
“arbitral hit-and-run” is a hypothetical concern not based on 
empirical evidence and providing that ICSID’s new 
proposed rules to its Arbitration Rules will only further 
impede third-party funded parties’ right of access to justice, 
this Article concludes that there is a clear prejudice against 
third-party funded parties.  Finally, this Article concludes 
by reflecting that this prejudice may undermine one of the 
purposes for which ICSID Convention was created: to 
provide a forum for aggrieved investors to resolve their 
investment disputes—no matter how poor and regardless of 
whether they are funded by a third-party.   
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Third-party funding (TPF)1 has increased substantially over 
the past several years as a means to reduce the financial 
burden of bringing an investment claim.2  For example, the 
global market for TPF in both litigation and arbitration is 
estimated as exceeding ten billion dollars. 3   Following 
TPF’s growth, there have been concerns as to whether a 
party funded by a TPF will “hit” a state with arbitration and 
“run” without paying for a costs award since third-party 
funders, as non-parties to arbitration, cannot be compelled to 
pay costs—a scenario commonly referred to as arbitral hit-
and-run.4   
 
In international investment arbitration, some respondent 
states have resorted to security for costs to prevent this 
 
* Young Hye (Martina) Chun is a Foreign Associate at Yulchon LLC, a global 
law firm located in Seoul, South Korea, in their International Dispute 
Resolution (“IDR”) Group.  Thank you to Yulchon LLC for the opportunity to 
work on this Article. She is a California-licensed attorney practicing 
international arbitration and litigation and represents Korean companies in 
various maritime, energy and insurance disputes.  Previously, she obtained her 
J.D. degree at Pepperdine School of Law where she edited for the Pepperdine 
Dispute Resolution Law Journal (“DRLJ”) and obtained her LL.M. degree in 
Alternative Dispute Resolution at USC School of Law.  
1 For the purposes of this Article, “third-party funder” generally refers to any 
non-party, which provides funding or resources for the purpose of financing 
arbitration either as a donation or in return for remuneration dependent on the 
outcome of the proceeding; See Sarah Moseley, Disclosing Third-Party 
Funding in International Investment Arbitration, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1181, 1186–
88 (2019).   
2 Moseley, supra note 1, at 1181–86. 
3 INT’L COUNCIL FOR COM. ARB., THE ICCA REPORTS NO. 4, REPORT OF THE 
ICCA-QUEEN MARY TASK FORCE ON THIRD-PARTY FUNDING IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 17 (2018) [hereinafter ICCA Task Report].  
4 Jennifer Trusz, Full Disclosure? Conflict of Interest Arising from Third-Party 
Funding in International Commercial Arbitration, 101 GEO. L.J. 1649, 1679 
(2013) (“One concern is with the so-called “hit-and-run” scheme, whereby the 
claimant abuses the system via the funding relationship: the claimant will gain 
by succeeding in arbitration, but if it is unsuccessful, it lacks the financial ability 
to pay for costs”).  
2
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feared outcome.5  Security for costs, an order directing a 
party to set aside funds to satisfy potential adverse costs, has 
been a rare specimen of remedies.  Up until 2014, there 
were no reported decisions awarding security for costs.6  As 
of February 2020, there are now three known decisions all 
with one common denominator—the existence of TPF.7  
  
Such special emphasis on TPF is also apparent in the new 
proposed rules to the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID)’s Arbitration Rules.8  While 
only three known decisions have awarded security for costs, 
ICSID has made it a priority to include a stand-alone 
provision just for security for costs.9  If adopted, parties will 
be required to affirmatively disclose their third-party 
funder,10 and tribunals will be endowed with authority to 
dismiss proceedings if a party fails to comply with a security 
for costs order.11  Combined with their express innuendo 
 
5 See Laurence Craig, Some Trends and Developments in the Laws and Practice 
of International Commercial Arbitration, 50 TEX. INT’L L.J. 699, 754–55 (2016) 
(“The possibility that an unsuccessful party may, in a final decision on the 
merits of the case, be required to contribute to the costs of his adversary is 
recognized in a number of legal systems, and indeed the ICC Rules permit 
arbitrators to make such an award”).  
6 Chiara Cilento & Benjamin Guthrie, Is Investor-State Arbitration Warming 
up to Security of Costs?, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (June 18, 2019), 
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/06/18/is-investor-state-
arbitration-warming-up-to-security-for-costs/ (“The order of security for costs 
affirmed by the RSM ad hoc committee was hailed as groundbreaking when it 
was published in 2014. No investment tribunal had previously issued such an 
order.”).  
7 See generally Cilento & Guthrie, supra note 6. 
8  INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPS., WORKING PAPER #4, 
PROPOSALS FOR AMENDMENT OF THE ICSID RULES 58–59 (2020) [hereinafter 
ICSID WORKING PAPER 4], 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/WP_4_Vol_1_En.pdf. Note: the 
proposed rules for ICSID’s Arbitration Rules begin on page 27.   
9 ICSID WORKING PAPER 4, supra note 8, at 58-59. (Proposed Rule 53).  
10 ICSID WORKING PAPER 4, supra note 8, at 37-38. (Proposed Rule 14). 
11 ICSID WORKING PAPER 4, supra note 8, at 58-59. (Proposed Rule 53(6)).  
3
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that TPF is a factor to justify ordering security for costs,12 
the proposed rules raise significant due process 
consequences for third-party funded parties as well. 
 
Given that arbitral hit-and-run concerns are not empirically 
supported by previous incidents but rather rest on a “what-
if” scenario, and since there are other measures to filter out 
unmeritorious claims, this Article posits that security for 
costs addresses a hypothetical concern at the cost of 
investors’ real due process rights.   
 
Part I of this Article sets the stage by introducing security for 
costs and providing two opposing interests underlying 
security for costs: “arbitral hit-and-run” concerns and a 
party’s right of access to justice.  Part II introduces Article 
47 of the ICSID Convention and Rule 39 of the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules and their applicability to security for costs.  
Part III demonstrates that previous decisions have failed to 
address whether adverse costs are “rights” entitled to 
preservation under Article 47 and proposes that adverse 
costs are not protectable rights.  Part IV provides that 
“arbitral hit-and-run” concerns are not based on any 
empirical evidence and thus unwarranted.  Part V delineates 
pertinent Proposed Rules to the ICSID’s Arbitration Rules 
and concludes that, if adopted, they would further impede 
third-party funded parties’ access to due process. 
 
I. SECURITY FOR COSTS 
A. SECURITY FOR COSTS 
“Security for costs” is a form of provisional measure, which 
orders a party to post security to cover the applicant’s 
expected costs in defending itself against the claim.13  The 
 
12 ICSID WORKING PAPER 4, supra note 8, at 58-59. (Proposed Rule 53(4)). 
13 SARAH BREWIN, BEST PRACTICES SERIES: SECURITIES FOR COSTS 1 (INT’L 
4
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aim is to protect parties from the unfortunate outcome in 
which they bear legal costs to defend unmeritorious claims 
but cannot collect a potential costs award due to the other 
party’s inability or unwillingness to pay.14  
 
B. ARBITRAL HIT-AND-RUN V. RIGHT OF ACCESS TO 
JUSTICE  
 
Arbitral hit-and-run has been defined as a situation “where 
the claimant’s arbitration fees and expenses are being 
covered by a related entity or individual who stands to gain 
if the claimant wins, but who would not be liable to meet any 
award of costs that might be made against the claimant if it 
lost.”15  On the other hand, there is a legitimate concern that 
security for costs may burden a party’s right of access to 
justice.16  For a claimant who is going through financial 
difficulties, perhaps due to a state’s misappropriation, 
posting security may be impossible where costs of 
international investment arbitration can reach tens of 
millions of U.S. dollars. 17   Failing to comply with a 
securities order may result in a termination of proceedings—
exemplifying the serious impact that security for costs may 
have on a claimant’s due process rights.18  
 
INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (IISD) Oct. 2018).    
14 BREWIN, supra note 13. 
15 J.E. Kalicki, Security for Costs in International Arbitration, TRANSNAT'L. 
DISPUTE MGMT. 3 (2006), https://www.transnational-dispute-
management.com/article.asp?key=827. 
16 See Jean-Baptiste Pessey, When to Grant Security for Costs in International 
Commercial Arbitration: the Complex Quest for a Uniform Test, CPR INT’L 




17  DAVID GOLDBERG ET AL., 2019 EMPIRICAL STUDY: PROVISIONAL 
MEASURES IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION, BRITISH INST. OF INT’L & 
COMPAR. L. 14 (White & Case, 2019).  
18 RSM Production Corporation v. Saint Lucia, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/10, 
Decision on Annulment, ¶¶ 145-148 (Apr. 29, 2019).  
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II. THE ICSID CONVENTION ON 
“SECURITY FOR COSTS” 
 
A. ARTICLE 47 AND RULE 39 OF THE ICSID 
CONVENTION 
 
Under the current ICSID regime, there is no rule particular 
to security for costs.19  Rather, they operate under ICSID 
Convention’s Section 3, Article 47 (Article 47) and ICSID’s  
Arbitration Rule 39, which govern all forms of provisional 
measures.20  Article 47 of the ICSID Convention allows a 
tribunal to order any provisional measure to preserve a 
party’s rights.21  Under Rule 39 of the ICSID Arbitration 
Rules, any party may request a tribunal for a provisional 
measure by “specify[ing] the rights to be preserved, the 
measures the recommendation of which is requested, and the 
circumstances that require such measures.”22  
 
Because these rules are construed broadly, prior ICSID cases 
have served as persuasive law for tribunals when 
determining whether to order security for costs.23  While 
there is no doctrine of precedent—or stare decisis—in 
ICSID arbitration, previous decisions have served a similar 
function to compensate for the lack of guidance.24  When 
addressing security for costs, tribunals have generally 
applied the same requirements as for other provisional 
 
19 Sam Luttrell, Observations on the Proposed new ICSID Regime for Security 
for Costs, 36 J. INT’L ARB. 3, 3–5 (2019). 
20  INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISP., ICSID CONVENTION, 
REGULATION AND RULES 24, 118, 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/ICSID%20Convention%20Engli
sh.pdf. [hereinafter ICSID RULES]. 
21 ICSID RULES, supra note 20, at 24 (ICSID Convention, Article 47). 
22 ICSID RULES, supra note 20, at 118 (ICSID Arbitration Rules, Rule 39).  
23 Luttrell, supra note 19. 
24 Luttrell, supra note 19. 
6
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measures: (i) identification of the rights to be preserved, (ii) 
requested measures to protect that interest, and (iii) 
circumstances 25  that require such measures. 26   But for 
security for costs, there has been one clear distinction, which 
is requiring an “exceptional circumstance.”27 
 
B. “EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES”: MATERIAL 
RISK THAT COST AWARD WILL NOT BE COMPLIED 
WITH 
 
While each tribunal attaches a different test to determine 
whether an exceptional circumstance exists, there is a 
general consensus for securities for costs—there must be a 
material risk that adverse costs will not be complied with.28  
In all three decisions ordering security for costs, the 
existence of a TPF arrangement played a crucial factor, 
albeit not the sole factor.  
 
25 Occidental Petroleum Corporation v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/06/11, Decision on Provisional Measures, ¶ 59 (Aug. 17, 2007) 
(“circumstances” defined as those for which “the measures are necessary to 
preserve a party’s rights and where the need is urgent in order to avoid 
irreparable harm”). 
26 ICSID RULES, supra note 20, at 118 (ICSID Arbitration Rules, Article 39(1)): 
At any time after the institution of the 
proceeding, a party may request that 
provisional measures for the 
preservation of its rights be 
recommended by the Tribunal. The 
request shall specify the rights to be 
preserved, the measures the 
recommendation of which is requested, 
and the circumstances that require such 
measures.  
27 Luttrell, supra note 19, at 4-5.  
28 RSM Prod. Corp. v. Saint Lucia, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/10, Decision on 
St. Lucia’s Request for Security for Costs, ¶¶ 77–82 (Aug. 12, 2014); Dirk 
Herzig as Insolvency Administrator over the Assets of Unionmatex 
Industrieanlagen GmbH v. Turkmenistan (hereinafter “Unionmatex”), ICSID 
Case No. ARB/18/35, Decision on the Respondent’s Request for Security for 
Costs and the Claimant’s Request for Security for Claim, ¶¶ 53–58 (Jan. 27, 
2020). 
7
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RSM Production Co. v. St. Lucia was the first known 
occasion in which security for costs was ordered.29  In 2014, 
the RSM majority tribunal granted St. Lucia’s request, 
finding that (i) the claimant’s history of non-compliance 
with costs awards in prior ICSID cases, (ii) its poor financial 
status, and (iii) the existence of TPF created a material and 
urgent risk that the claimant would not reimburse St. 
Lucia—creating an “exceptional circumstance.”30   While 
RSM serves as a “landmark” case as the first decision to 
order security for costs against a third-party funded party, 
the existence of TPF seemed to have served as only an 
ancillary factor, and the tribunal weighed the claimant’s 
prior history of non-compliance heavily in ordering security 
for costs. 31   The RSM proceeding was dismissed with 
prejudice when claimant failed to comply with the security 
for cost order.32  
 
Four years later, in 2018, the second known security for costs 
order was issued in Armas v. República Boliviariana de 
Venezuela. 33   Relying on the RSM decision, the Armas 
tribunal found that an exceptional circumstance existed since 
(i) the claimants were funded by TPF, (ii) the claimants did 
not have the resources to pay the adverse costs order, and 
(iii) the underlying TPF arrangement precluded the funder 
from any cost liability.34  
 
Finally, Unionmatex v. Turkmenistan is the third and last 
known decision to order security for costs, which was 
 
29 RSM Prod. Corp., supra note 28, at ¶¶ 27, 53–54. 
30 RSM Prod. Corp., supra note 28, at ¶¶ 77-84.  
31 RSM Prod. Corp., supra note 28, at ¶¶ 81-82. 
32 RSM Prod. Corp., supra note 18 (The Decision on Annulment).  
33  Armas v. República Boliviariana de Venezuela, PCA Case No. 2016-08, 
Decision on Request for Security for Costs, ¶ 261 (June 20, 2018).  
34 Armas, supra note 33, at ¶¶ 199, 243–44, 250. 
8
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rendered in January 2020. 35   In this case, which is still 
ongoing, a third-party funded claimant brought a claim 
against Turkmenistan alleging that its misappropriation 
caused its insolvency. 36   The majority tribunal granted 
Turkmenistan’s application for security for costs and found 
that an exceptional circumstance existed on the following 
grounds: (i) the claimant was insolvent, (ii) the existence of 
TPF, and (iii) the funding arrangement explicitly absolving 
the funder from cost liability, the same factor existing in 
Armas. 37   Here, the third factor—TPF arrangement 
absolving the funder from adverse cost liability—was found 
to create a “more extreme situation.” 38   Reasoning that 
neither the claimants nor the third-party funder would be 
able to pay adverse costs due to the party’s impecuniosity or 
the funder’s non-liability for costs, the tribunal found that an 
exceptional circumstance existed.39  
 
C. PREJUDICE AGAINST THIRD-PARTY FUNDED 
PARTIES 
 
Until the RSM decision in 2014, not only were there no 
decisions ordering security for costs in international 
investment arbitration, but there were also no TPFs involved 
in those cases. 40   Prior to RSM, the consistent view of 
tribunals addressing security for cost has been that there is 
no financial requirement to proceed in ICSID arbitration,41 
 
35 Unionmatex, supra note 28. 
36 Unionmatex, supra note 28, at ¶ 1. 
37 Unionmatex, supra note 28, at ¶¶ 57-58.  
38 Unionmatex, supra note 28, at ¶ 57. 
39 Unionmatex, supra note 28, at ¶¶ 57–60. 
40 For the purpose of this Article, sixteen reported ICSID security for cost 
decisions were examined. 
41 Grynberg et al. v. Grenada, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/6, Tribunal’s Decision 
on Respondent’s Application for Security for Costs, ¶ 5.19 (October. 14, 2010) 
(“[I]t is simply not part of the ICSID dispute resolution system that an investor’s 
claim should be heard only upon the establishment of a sufficient standing of 
the investor to meet a possible costs award”); Burimi et al. v. Republic of 
9
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emphasizing the serious risk that such an order would have 
in stifling a claimant’s right to due process.42  
 
It was not until RSM, Armas, and Unionmatex that TPF arose 
as a factor which helped to justify a securities for costs 
order.43  In RSM, the tribunal reasoned that the existence of 
TPF supports its concern that the claimant would not comply 
with a costs award since “it is doubtful whether the third 
party will assume responsibility for honoring such an 
award.”44  In Armas and Unionmatex, the TPF arrangement 
precluding the funder from costs liability served as a 
determinative factor on the ground that, without the funder, 
no one would be able to pay adverse costs.45 
 
However, this scenario is not different from a scenario in 
which there is only an insolvent party and no TPF.  In both 
scenarios, the risk of the applicant’s non-collection of costs 
is the same—“either way, [the applicant] would not receive 
an ordered reimbursement of its costs.”46  Since tribunals 
 
Albania, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/18, Procedural Order No.2, ¶ 41 (May 3, 
2012) (“Tribunal would be reluctant to impose on the Claimants what amounts 
to an additional financial requirement as a condition for the case to proceed”); 
EuroGas Inc. v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/14, Procedural 
Order No.3, ¶ 123 (June 23, 2015); Lighthouse Corp. v. Democratic Republic 
of Timor-Leste, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/2, Procedural Order No.2, ¶ 60 (Feb. 
13, 2016) (“[T]here is no requirement in the ICSID system that a claimant must 
demonstrate its solvency”). 
42 Gustav F W Hamester GmbH & Co KG v. Republic of Ghana, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/07/24, Award ¶ 17 (June 18, 2010) (Application or a security for cost 
order rejected on the ground that “there was a serious risk that an order for 
security for costs would stifle the claimant’s claims . . . .”). 
43 RSM Prod. Corp., supra note 28, at ¶ 83; Armas, supra note 33. Unionmatex, 
supra note 28, at ¶¶ 53–62.  
44 RSM Prod. Corp., supra note 28, at ¶ 83. 
45 Unionmatex, supra note 28, at ¶¶ 53–62. 
46  Lars Markert, Security for Costs Applications in Investment Arbitrations 
Involving Insolvent Investors, 11(2) CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 217, 231 (Dec. 13, 
2018), available at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3295803 (last accessed 
March 30, 2020). 
10
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have held a party’s impecuniosity to be insufficient to order 
security for costs,47 the existence of TPF or its terms should 
not make a difference.  The fact that the term absolving the 
third-party funder from cost liability was in the limelight of 
Armas and Unionmatex shows inherent prejudice against 
third-party funded parties since the feared scenario of no one 
being liable to pay costs at the end of arbitration would be 
the same if there was just an insolvent investor and no TPF.  
If there is no requirement for a claimant to prove its financial 
standing to proceed with ICSID arbitration, then the same 
protection should be afforded to those who are funded by 
TPF—regardless of whether their funder is liable for costs. 
 
III. PUTTING THE HORSE BEFORE THE 
CARRIAGE 
 
Further, tribunals granting security for costs have missed the 
more fundamental gateway issue of whether a “right” 
entitled to preservation exists in the first place.  Eskosol, 
Anderson, and Lighthouse tribunals acutely noted that “the 
starting point is identification of the particular ‘rights’ that 
the applicant claims are appropriate to be preserved”—
which is to precede any decisions on whether “exceptional 
circumstances” exist. 48   However, decisions ordering 
security for costs have blindly accepted that security for 
costs qualifies as a right to be preserved.49 
 
 
47 Grynberg, supra note 41, at ¶ 5.19. 
48  Eskosol S.P.A. in Liquidazione v. Italian Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/15/50, Procedural Order No.3, ¶ 32 (Apr. 12, 2017); see also Anderson v. 
Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/3, Decision on 
Provisional Measures, ¶ 23 (Nov. 5, 2008) (“[A]t this point in the proceeding, 
the Respondent has not proven the existence of any rights whose preservation 
requires the requested provisional measures.”); Lighthouse Corp., supra note 
41, at ¶ 56 (“The first requirement for provisional measures is that the latter 
seek to preserve rights of the applicant”).  
49 RSM Prod. Corp., supra note 28, at ¶¶ 72-74; Unionmatex, supra note 28, at 
¶¶ 51–52. 
11
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For example, in RSM, the majority tribunal limited its 
findings of a protectable “right” to the bare-bone holding 
that “conditional rights such as the potential claim for cost 
reimbursement qualify as ‘rights to be preserved.’” 50  
Similarly, the Unionmatex tribunal made a simple 
conclusory statement that “Turkmenistan has specified the 
right to be preserved.”51  Since provisional measures would 
not be available without “rights” to be “preserved”, these 
decisions indeed “put the horse before the carriage.”52 
 
A. ADVERSE COSTS – NOT A PROTECTABLE RIGHT   
Security for costs reflects the applicant’s alleged “right” to 
adverse costs.  In 2017, the Eskosol tribunal first raised the 
question of whether a party’s asserted “right” to collect a 
possible costs award is one that is protectable.53  Notable 
authorities have also noted this gateway issue raised by 
Eskosol as one that is emerging and complex.  However, 
ICSID tribunals or other authorities are yet to address this 
issue.54  Even in Eskosol, the tribunal did not answer this 
question, holding that the Eskosol applicant would not be 
entitled to security for costs even if it had a protectable 
right. 55   This Article addresses Eskosol’s unanswered 
question by dividing provisional measures into two 
categories: those protecting procedural rights and those 
protecting substantive rights.56  This distinction is crucial 
since a provisional measure (e.g., security for costs) must 
 
50 RSM Prod. Corp., supra note 28, at ¶¶ 72-74. 
51 Unionmatex, supra note 28, at ¶ 52. 
52 ICSID RULES, supra note 20, at 24 (ICSID Convention, Article 47); ICSID 
RULES, supra note 20, at 118 (ICSID Arbitration Rules, Rule 39).  
53 Eskosol, supra note 48, at ¶¶ 32-36. 
54 Markert, supra note 46, at 225. 
55 Eskosol, supra note 48, at ¶ 36. 
56 RSM Prod. Corp., supra note 28, at ¶ 69 (“The predominant objective of 
provisional measures is to protect the integrity of the proceedings. This integrity 
comprises both substantive and procedural rights”); Lighthouse Corp., supra 
note 41, at ¶ 56 (“These rights can be substantive or procedural in nature”). 
12
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serve the function of protecting either of the two rights.  
This Article concludes that a party’s right to adverse costs 
are not protectable since it is neither a procedural right nor a 
substantive right.  
 
(i) PROCEDURAL RIGHTS  
Procedural rights are those that are related to a party’s path 
to pursue its claim or defense. 57   Compelling witness 
attendance and preservation of evidence fall under this 
category—for example, certain evidence may be required to 
satisfy an essential element of a party’s claim.  By 
definition, procedural rights: (i) exist at the time of the 
application and (ii) preservation of these rights must serve a 
procedural function for the party’s pursuit of the claim.  
 
In RSM, security for costs was categorized as a “procedural 
right.”58  However, security for costs does not fit into this 
category.  First, there are no existing rights to adverse costs 
since costs are awarded at the end of arbitration.  Second, 
security for costs does not serve a procedural function.  As 
the Eskosol tribunal noted, presence or absence of assets to 
satisfy a possible adverse costs order does not impede a 
party’s path to obtain a favorable award.59  As such, the 
Eskosol tribunal determined that security for cost is “not 
truly a concern about a procedural right but instead an 




57 Eskosol, supra note 48, at ¶ 33. 
58 RSM, supra note 28, at ¶ 64 (“the right invoked by Respondent can be 
qualified as a procedural right not directly related to the subject matter of the 
dispute.”). 
59 Eskosol, supra note 48, at ¶¶ 32-33. 
60 Eskosol, supra note 48, at ¶ 33. 
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(ii) SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS 
Since adverse costs do not protect a “procedural right”, 
adverse costs must fall under the “substantive right” 
category in order to give rise to a provisional measure.  
Substantive rights are those that are related to the subject 
matter of the dispute.61  Often referred to as a measure to 
protect a party’s “right to an effective relief,” “maintaining 
the status quo,” or “preventing further aggravation,” 
substantive rights are those that ensure that a party’s rights 
relating to the subject matter of the dispute will be preserved 
until the final resolution.62  The intent is to ensure that any 
final award on the merits is not impaired by acts taken by the 
other party during the pendency of deliberation.  Unlike 
procedural rights, substantive rights need not exist at the 
time of application and may be conditional on prevailing in 
arbitration—as long as the right relates to the dispute.63  For 
the purposes of this Article, non-existing substantive rights 
shall be referred to as “conditional rights,” which is to be 






61 Amco v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Decision on 
Request for Provisional Measures, ¶ 3 (Dec. 9, 1983) (provisional measures 
only protect “rights in dispute”); Plama v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/24, Order, ¶ 39 (Sept. 6, 2005) (provisional measures protect “rights 
relating the dispute”).  
62 Amco, supra note 61, at ¶ 3; Plama, supra note 61, at ¶ 39.  
63  Occidental Petroleum Corp., supra note 25, at ¶ 63 (Aug. 17, 2007) 
(claimants “need only show that they allege the kind of claims that—if 
proven—would entitle claimants to substantial relief”). 
64 Occidental Petroleum Corp., supra note 25, at ¶ 89 (holding that provisional 
measures are “not meant to protect against any potential or hypothetical harm 
susceptible to result from uncertain actions”); See also Anderson, supra note 48, 
at ¶ 23 (denying an application for a security for costs order on the ground that 
“[r]espondent has only a mere expectation” and “has not proven the existence 
of any rights whose preservation requires the requested provisional measures”).  
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a. “Conditional” Substantive Rights  
 
A “conditional right" can be construed to denote a right, the 
existence of which is certain to arise when the applicant 
prevails.  Lao Holdings v. The Government of the Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic is instructive in defining 
what constitutes a “conditional right.”65  In Lao Holdings, 
the dispute was whether the claimant was entitled to extend 
its agreement with the Lao government, which would have 
sheltered the claimant from the Lao government’s high tax 
rates.66  The claimant sought a provisional measure seeking 
to enjoin the Lao government from any attempts to collect 
its taxes and from seizing the claimant’s property until the 
resolution of the dispute.67  In granting claimant’s request, 
the Lao Holdings tribunal noted that the “right to be 
preserved” need not exist at the provisional measures 
stage.68  Here, the claimant’s non-liability for Lao’s taxes 
was a “conditional right” since it would have certainly arisen 
if the claimant prevailed (i.e., the claimant was entitled to 
extend its agreement with the government).  
 
b. “Hypothetical” Substantive Rights 
 
On the other hand, a “hypothetical right” refers to those 
rights, the occurrence of which depends on factors additional 
to prevailing in arbitration.69  This term was first coined in 
a 1999 ICSID decision, Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain.70  
Here, the tribunal recognized that security for costs would 
 
65 Lao Holdings v. The Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/12/6, Decision on Claimant’s Amended Application 
for Provisional Measures (Sept. 17, 2013). 
66 Lao Holdings, supra note 65, at ¶¶ 7-8. 
67 Lao Holdings, supra note 65, at ¶ 9.  
68 Lao Holdings, supra note 65, at ¶ 16.  
69  See Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, 
Procedural Order No. 2, ¶¶ 16-18 (Oct. 28, 1999).  
70 Maffezini, supra note 69, at ¶¶ 13-18.  
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be based on a “hypothetical right” not entitled to a 
provisional measure.  Specifically, the tribunal recognized 
that security for costs would be based on a “hypothetical 
right” by noting that ordering security for costs would 
require making two merit-based assumptions: (1) the 
applicant will prevail and (2) the applicant will “deem the 
claimant’s case to be of such nature as to require it to pay 
[adverse costs,]” which would be inappropriate at that 
stage.71  The Maffezini tribunal’s recognition is important 
because it captures the delicate conundrum with security for 
costs orders - - they seek to protect a right that will not come 
into existence solely by the applicant’s prevailing on the 
merits but, rather, they will only come into existence if the 
applicant prevails and if the applicant also convinces the 
tribunal that it is entitled to costs of the arbitration (i.e., a 
“hypothetical right””).  
 
Despite the crucial distinction between “conditional rights” 
and “hypothetical rights”, ICSID tribunals ordering security 
for costs failed to recognize this delicate distinction.  This 
failure is important because the RSM decision, the first to 
order security for costs, is premised upon the overly simple 
proposition that “rights to be preserved by a provisional 
measure need not already exist at the time the request is 
made” and that “conditional rights such as the potential 
claim for cost reimbursement” are protectable.72  While the 
RSM tribunal recognized the difference between existing and 
conditional rights, it failed to recognize that some rights are 
conditional and hypothetical.  Following RSM, two other 
ICSID tribunals relied on RSM for this proposition in 
addressing security for costs applications. 73   This is 
 
71 Maffezini, supra note 69, at ¶¶ 16-17. 
72 RSM Prod. Corp., supra note 28, at ¶ 72.  
73 BSG Resources Ltd. v. Republic of Guinea, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/22, 
Procedural Order No. 3, ¶ 75 (Nov. 25, 2015) (“[W]hile the Tribunal 
acknowledges that the right requiring preservation relies on two hypothetical 
events (that the Respondent will prevail in this arbitration and that it will be 
16
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troubling since the RSM tribunal fails to distinguish between 
“conditional rights” and “hypothetical rights” and by this 
definition, any right would be protectable—even those based 
on conjectures and speculations.  
 
A party’s entitlement to adverse costs is not a substantive 
right because it is not related to the subject matter of the 
dispute.  By way of example, in the Lao Holdings case, the 
respondent (i.e., Lao government)’s attorney fees would not 
relate to whether the claimant was entitled to extend their 
agreement.  Further, a party’s right to adverse costs is not a 
“conditional right” since prevailing in arbitration would not 
give rise to adverse costs.74  As summarized by one of the 
Unionmatex arbitrators, adverse costs are only awarded if a 
party prevails and persuades the tribunal that the 
unsuccessful party (a) advanced patently unmeritorious or 
legally untenable claims, (b) abused the investment 
arbitration process, (c) presented poor and inefficient 
pleadings, or (d) engaged in egregious underlying conduct.75  
In fact, successful parties were reported to recover costs in 
only sixty-one percent of ICSID cases.76  
 
Since a party’s right to adverse costs is neither a procedural 
right nor a substantive right, it cannot be a right that is 
protectable within the meaning of Article 47 -- a crucial 
gateway issue that tribunals granting security for costs have 
 
awarded costs), it nevertheless deems that the prima facie existence of a right 
has been established.”); Lighthouse Corp., supra note 41, at ¶ 57.  
74  Anderson, supra note 48, at ¶ 26 (“At this point in proceeding, the 
Respondent cannot be considered to be a holder of a legal right, but only the 
bearer of a mere expectation [to adverse costs]”). 
75 Lucy Reed, Allocation of costs in international arbitration, 26 ICSID REV.: 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 76, 84 (2011).  
76 Matthew Hodgson, Investment Treaty Arbitration: Cost, Duration and Size 
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failed to distinguish.  This Article proposes that the 
distinction between “conditional rights” and “hypothetical 
rights” is significant because while both rights refer to 
future, contingent events, only the former is protectable.  
This failure to distinguish between protectable and non-
protectable rights has directly prejudiced third-party funded 
parties since they have been the only victims to security for 
costs thus far.  
 
This Article does not propose, however, that all securities for 
costs existing in international arbitration are invalid.  
Instead, it merely posits that securities for cost orders in the 
ICSID system present a problem because adverse costs are 
not protected rights within the meaning of Article 47. 
 
B. “MERITS” – NOT CONSIDERED OR PRESUMED IN 
FAVOR OF THE STATE?  
 
Not only do securities for costs protect a right that should not 
be protectable under Article 47, there is also a subtle, yet 
powerful presumption that warrants attention.  Tribunals 
granting security for costs essentially make merit-based 
assumptions in favor of applicants, including assumptions 
that: (i) applicants will prevail; and (ii) applicants will be 
awarded cost awards.  However, they do not afford 
claimants the same privilege.  The Unionmatex tribunal, for 
example, refused to consider a claimant’s assertion that 
Turkmenistan’s acts caused its insolvency, claiming it as a 
“merits” issue subject to later assessment.77  This imbalance 
is significant because investors may face an early 
termination of their proceedings before they have a chance 
to prove states’ wrongful acts.   
 
 
77 Unionmatex, supra note 28, at ¶ 66. 
18
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol21/iss2/5
[Vol. 21: 477, 2021]                                         Security for Costs 
                                             PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
 
 495 
In regard to this, the Unionmatex claimant made a comical, 
but strong point that security for costs ordered against it 
would encourage host states to “do the job right” to “better 
ensure the investor’s insolvency and prevent any BIT claim 
from the outset.”78  While this may sound comical at first, it 
is not entirely inconceivable, especially for investors whose 
assets are stripped away by states’ wrongful acts.  It may 
turn the David and Goliath biblical story into a reality, 
except Goliath’s acts would be allowed to proceed without 
legal repercussions.79   
 
IV. ‘ARBITRAL HIT-AND-RUN’    
 - JUMPING THE GUN 
 
As noted above, the concern underlying “arbitral hit-and-
run” is that applicants will have to expend significant costs 
to defend an unmeritorious claim but will be left with no 
means to collect potential cost awards.80  The idea is that 
investors, with the help of TPF, will indiscriminately “hit” 
states with arbitral proceedings with the hope that one sticks, 
and if it doesn’t prevail, it will “run,” leaving no one to 
satisfy the cost award. 81   However, this concern is 
unwarranted on three points: (1) third-party funders do not 
fund unmeritorious claims—in fact, the existence of TPF 
shows good prospects of success given the high level of due 
 
78 Unionmatex, supra note 28, at ¶ 37. 
79 Unionmatex, supra note 28, at ¶ 66: 
The Tribunal must ignore Dr Herzig’s 
allegation that it is unreasonable for 
Turkmenistan to obtain security for costs when 
it was Turkmenistan that allegedly caused the 
insolvency of Unionmatex. This is plainly a 
merits issue, subject to later assessment and 
one on which the Tribunal expresses no view 
at this stage.  
80 Trusz, supra note 4.  
81 Kalicki, supra note 15. 
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diligence a claim undergoes in order to be funded;82  (2) 
ICSID rules have many other effective mechanisms to filter 
out unmeritorious claims—which don’t involve penalizing 
claimants for their financial status—including “screening for 
manifest lack of jurisdiction before registration of a request, 
a motion to dismiss for manifest lack of legal merit and 
bifurcated preliminary motions”; 83  and (3) there is no 
empirical evidence supporting “arbitral hit-and-runs.”  
Only one case was found to allegedly support an “arbitral 
hit-and-run,” S&T Oil v. Romania,84 which was not really an 
“arbitral hit-and-run” case.  In S&T Oil, the case was 
discontinued because the third-party-funded claimant failed 
to pay advance on costs after its TPF withdrew from the 
case.85  Thereafter, there were notions made to the effect 
that this situation could have quickly turned into a scenario 
where the respondent could not have been able to recover its 
costs,86 and that security for costs could somehow have been 
the solution.  This is what, in America, is referred to as 
“jumping the gun, i.e., making a decision that is premature.”  
In S&T, the case was discontinued from the claimant’s 
failure to pay advance costs and, in any event, the claimant 
 
82 ICCA Task Report, supra note 3, at 25 (TPF Applications have suggested 
rejection rates of 90% or higher, and applications undergo a detailed due 
diligence in order to ensure that there is a “solid claim with a healthy 
recoverable margin”); Third Party Funding in International Arbitration, 
ASHURST (Feb. 21, 2020), https://www.ashurst.com/en/news-and-
insights/legal-updates/quickguide---third-party-funding-in-international-
arbitration/.  
83 Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules—Working Paper, 131 at ¶ 242 
(Aug. 2, 2018).  
84  S&T Oil Equipment and Machinery Ltd. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/13, Order of Discontinuance of the Proceeding (July 16, 2010).   
85 S&T Oil, supra note 84, at ¶ 32; See Umika Sharma, Third Party Funding in 
Investment Arbitration: Time to Change Double Standards Employed for 




86 Sharma, supra note 85. 
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would not have been able to proceed with the case.87  Since 
this is the only case found to form the basis for “arbitral hit-
and-run,” there is a legitimate question as to whether this is 
merely a premature worry based on a hypothetical situation 
instead of actual cases.  
 
V. ICSID CONVENTION’S PROPOSED 
CHANGES 
 
Against this backdrop, the new Proposed Rules (PR) to the 
ICSID Convention’s Arbitration Rules,88 if adopted, would 
lower the threshold to obtain security for costs while making 
other provisional measures more difficult.  Pertinently, PR 
14 would require parties to affirmatively disclose their TPF 
arrangement, and tribunals may order disclosure of TPF 
terms.89  While disclosure of a party’s third-party funder 
may be useful to prevent any conflict of interest issues that 
may arise between funders and arbitrators, tribunals’ 
authority to disclose TPF terms seems problematic, 
especially given that a TPF term absolving the funder from 
cost liability was the determinative factor in the Unionmatex 
and Armas tribunals’ decisions to order security for cost.90  
 
Further, securities for cost would have their own stand-alone 
provision under PR 53 and it is not in the third-party funded 
parties’ best interests.91  First, under PR 53(4), TPF is out 
rightly put under an unfavorable light with its mandate that 
TPF “may not by itself be sufficient to justify an order for 
security for costs.”92  While this rule seems to have the best 
interests of third-party funded parties at heart, it is really a 
 
87 See S&T Oil, supra note 84. 
88 ICSID WORKING PAPER 4, supra note 8.   
89 ICSID WORKING PAPER 4, supra note 8, at 37-38. (Proposed Rule 14). 
90 Unionmatex, supra note 28, at ¶¶ 57–60.  
91 ICSID WORKING PAPER 4, supra note 8, at 58-59. (Proposed Rule 53).  
92 ICSID WORKING PAPER 4, supra note 8, at 58-59. (Proposed Rule 53(4)). 
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knife in disguise.  The word “justify” draws a negative 
inference for TPF.  It presupposes that TPF would certainly 
be a factor in favor of ordering security for costs if it were 
accompanied by another factor.  Second, PR 53(6) would 
endow tribunals with the authority to dismiss proceedings if 
a party fails to comply with a security for cost order.93  This 
is meaningful given that, under the current rules, the only 
express grounds for suspension of a proceeding are for 
vacancy, lack of jurisdiction and arbitrator 
disqualification,94 none of which penalize a claimant for its 
financial conditions.  Last but certainly not least, PR 53 
does not require a “rights to be preserved,” lowering the 
threshold for security for costs even more.95  
 
Meanwhile, all other forms of provisional measures would 
be governed by PR 47, which provides more detailed 
guidance on what warrants provisional measures by listing 
non-exhaustive circumstances giving rise to provisional 
measures (e.g., prevent imminent harm). 96   While 
provisional measures are not restricted to these 
circumstances, it nevertheless demonstrates the kind of 
extraordinary situations that prompt provisional measures.97  
Second, PR 47(3) explicitly requires tribunals to consider 
whether provisional measures are “urgent” and “necessary,” 
which is not always considered by tribunals. 98   For 
example, the Unionmatex tribunal found that urgency is not 
a requirement in issuing security for costs.99  They seem to 
 
93 ICSID WORKING PAPER 4, supra note 8, at 58-59. (Proposed Rule 53(6)).  
94 ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules (2006), Rules 9(6), 10(2), 29(3); 
ICSID Arbitration Rule 41.  
95 ICSID WORKING PAPER 4, supra note 8, at 58-59. (Proposed Rule 53).  
96 ICSID WORKING PAPER 4, supra note 8, at 54-55. (Proposed Rule 47(1)(a)).  
97 ICSID WORKING PAPER 4, supra note 8, at 54-55. (Proposed Rule 47(1)). 
98 ICSID WORKING PAPER 4, supra note 8, at 54-55. (Proposed Rule 47(3)(a)). 
99 Unionmatex, supra note 28, at ¶ 67: 
Insofar as the element of urgency is concerned, 
the Tribunal is not persuaded that 
Turkmenistan must prove an urgent need for 
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disparately treat security for costs apart from other forms of 
provisional measures -- in order to make provisional 
measures more difficult to obtain while ensuring that 
securities for costs remain easier to obtain. 
 
Third-Party disclosure—great.  The ICSID Convention 
would be better prepared for the likely growth of TPF by 
preventing potential conflict-of-interest issues.  But the 
innuendo that TPF is a factor justifying security for cost 
combined with the tribunal’s new-found authority to dismiss 
proceedings upon non-compliance—maybe not so much.  
Together, they carry significant due process consequences 
for third-party funded claimants.  Further, failure to 
reciprocate changes in Proposed Rule 47 to Proposed Rule 
53 should not be ignored.  If adopted, these proposed rules 
would serve the function of filtering out third-party funded 
claims early on, for impecunious claimants, without any 
regard to their assertion that the state’s misconduct caused 
their impecuniosity.  In light of prior decisions, one cannot 
help but feel that the Proposed Rules are, and dare I say it, a 
witch-hunt for third-party funded parties.100   
 
 
the provisional measure of security for costs. 
In any event, given that the arbitration remains 
at an early stage with the final evidentiary 
hearing not scheduled until September 2021, 
the Tribunal perceives no urgency. 
100 A similar attitude to a “witch-hunt” was captured by one member of the 
RSM tribunal. See RSM Prod. Corp., supra note 28, at ¶ 18 (Assenting reasons):  
My determinative proposition is that once it 
appears that there is third party funding of 
investor’s claims, the onus is cast on the 
claimant to disclose all relevant factors and 
make a case why security for costs orders 
should not be made.   
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Based on the previous three ICSID cases ordering security 
for costs and ICSID Convention’s Proposed Rules, there is a 
recurring theme—TPF.  With growing appearances of 
third-party funded parties in ICSID arbitration, the tribunals’ 
uniform position that there is no financial requirement to 
proceed in ICSID arbitration seemed to have shifted, as 
demonstrated by RSM, Armas and Unionmatex, revealing 
their critical stance towards TPF.  Additionally, the above 
tribunals’ conclusory finding that adverse costs are 
“protectable rights” within the meaning of Article 47 was 
akin to putting the horse before the carriage since provisional 
measures are only available for protectable rights.  This 
Article sought to address the Eskosol tribunal’s unanswered 
question by distinguishing “procedural rights” from 
“substantive rights,” which may be conditional but not 
hypothetical, and proposed that a party’s right to adverse 
costs is not protectable.  Given that arbitral hit-and-run 
concerns are not empirically supported by previous cases but 
rather rest on a hypothetical scenario, and since there are 
other measures to filter out unmeritorious claims, this Article 
concluded that security for costs addresses a hypothetical 
concern at the cost of investors’ real rights to pursue their 
claims under the ICSID system.   
 
Considering the ICSID Convention’s Proposed Rules and its 
following implications, there is a legitimate concern as to 
whether the ICSID Convention would still reflect one of the 
purposes for which it was created: to provide a forum for 
aggrieved investors to resolve their investment disputes—no 
matter how poor they are and regardless of whether they are 
third-party funded.    
24
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